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INTRODUCTION
When citizens call a loved one from a cell phone, use a credit card
to purchase a New York Times bestseller on Amazon, or type in a social
security number to apply for an online loan, they surrender all privacy
rights to that information.1 These citizens must rely on a merchant or
service provider to protect this information from being unlawfully
accessed by third parties.2 In the unfortunate event of an online data
breach, some citizens may discover unauthorized charges on their credit
cards, and may be forced, at substantial cost, to close all of their online
accounts, repair damage to their credit score, and take other measures to
prevent future harm.3 Citizens may find it difficult, however, to recover
†

Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School.
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976) (holding that consumers forfeit
their privacy rights in financial information that is given to a bank teller); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (upholding the use of a pen register to monitor outgoing calls from a
suspect’s residence).
2 See,
e.g., Online Data Breach Reports Increase, ACA INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.acainternational.org/creditors-online-data-breach-reports-increase-31825.aspx
(last
visited Mar. 3, 2015) (discussing the prevalence of online data breaches and the resulting
misappropriation of personal information).
3 Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, Data Breaches: What the Underground World of ‘Carding’
Reveals, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 375, 379 (2009). Peretti further states:
1

The compromise of credit and debit card account information most often results in the
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mitigation damages and often cannot sue a merchant or provider for the
invasion of privacy that online data breaches cause.4
Specifically, the standing, third party, and reasonable expectation
of privacy doctrines limit consumers’ ability to recover costs associated
with preventing future harm from online data breaches, which can
include credit and internet monitoring services, identity theft insurance
and/or data breach risk mitigation services.5 Indeed, consumers are
often unable to recover mitigation damages for purchasing services like
those mentioned above because the prevention of future harm is not
considered sufficiently imminent to confer standing.6
Additionally, courts typically reject claims based on an invasion of
privacy theory.7 This is due in part to the third-party doctrine, which
states that citizens surrender all privacy rights in information voluntarily
conveyed to a third party, and thus must assume the risk that such
information will be knowingly or inadvertently conveyed to others,
including the government.8 As a result, when a merchant’s or provider’s
server is hacked, consumers do not suffer an actual, concrete, and
cognizable legal “injury” and therefore lack Article III standing to sue

type of identity theft referred to as “account takeover,” which involves fraud on
existing financial accounts. Account takeovers occur, for example, when a criminal
uses a stolen credit card number to make fraudulent purchases on an existing credit
line. Account takeovers are the more common type of identity theft, in contrast to a
second type of identity theft referred to as “new account creation.” New account
creations involve the fraudulent creation of new accounts, for example, when a
criminal uses stolen data to open a bank or credit card account in someone else’s name.
Id.
4 See, e.g., Douglas H. Meal, Private Data Security Breach Litigation in the United States,
2014 WL 10442 at *3 (January 2014). Courts are reluctant to reward emotional distress or
privacy damages for online data breaches:

Plaintiffs have . . . alleged that the exposure of their information injured them by
causing emotional injury, such as anxiety or stress, or a loss of privacy. Neither theory
appears to have been embraced by the courts. Courts have generally found allegations
of emotional distress to be insufficient to state a claim for relief. As to loss of privacy,
some courts have held that a loss of privacy constitutes actionable harm only if there is
an intentional or egregious invasion of privacy not present in actions against breached
companies, while others have rejected such claims of harm outright.
Id. (citing Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1055 (E.D. Mo. 2009); In re
Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 132–33 (D. Me.
2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom, Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 166–
67 (1st Cir. 2011); Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A.2d 702, 711 (D.C. 2009);
Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127–28 (N.D. Cal. 2008)).
5 See, e.g., Once Again, Clapper Defeats Data Breach Class Action, DATA PRIVACY
MONITOR (Feb. 14, 2014) http://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/online-privacy/once-againclapper-defeats-data-breach-class-action.
6 See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 657 (S.D. Ohio 2014)
(holding that the plaintiffs could not recover costs associated with preventing future harm).
7
See Meal, supra note 4, at *3 (“Plaintiffs have . . . alleged that the exposure of their
information injured them by causing emotional injury . . . or a loss of privacy. Neither theory
appears to have been embraced by courts”).
8 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
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on privacy grounds.9
This Essay argues that, in the context of online data breaches, these
doctrines hinder consumers from receiving full monetary compensation
and do not adequately safeguard privacy rights. For example, courts
frequently dismiss consumers’ suits against online service providers for
lack of standing, which results in consumers bearing the cost for
damages that the providers were in a position to prevent. This Essay
argues that the Supreme Court should relax the standing doctrine’s
“imminent harm” requirement and permit consumers to sue providers
for mitigation damages. In addition, the Court should abandon the longstanding principle that citizens lose all privacy protections in personal
information voluntarily given to third parties. Relatedly, the Court
should modify the two-pronged framework set forth in Katz v. United
States10 and focus exclusively on whether there exists an objective
societal expectation of privacy in personal information that third parties
unlawfully access.11 This approach will ensure that consumers are fully
compensated for the direct and foreseeable harms that online data
breaches cause, and provide incentives for private companies to adopt
stringent policies that minimize the risk of future breaches.
I.
A.

INSUFFICIENT LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CONSUMERS
The Third-Party Doctrine’s Impact on Privacy Rights and
Standing

In Katz v. United States, the Court held that Fourth Amendment
protections apply only where an individual has a subjective expectation
of privacy in the data or objects that are subject to a search, and where
“society is prepared to recognize [that expectation] as ‘reasonable.’”12
Although breaches of a private company’s server do not implicate the
Fourth Amendment,13 the third-party doctrine is an outgrowth of Katz
and reflects the Court’s view that citizens do not retain privacy rights
when they knowingly and intentionally surrender information to third
parties.
The third-party doctrine is a product of pre-digital era case law. In
9 See, e.g., Lexi Rubow, Standing in the Way of Privacy Protections: The Argument for a
Relaxed Article III Standing Requirement for Constitutional and Statutory Causes of Action, 29
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1007, 1010 (2014).
10 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
11 See id.
12 Id.
13 The Fourth Amendment only applies to state action; merchants and providers are not
considered state actors. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614
(1989) (noting that “the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an
arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative”).
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United States v. Miller, the Court held that citizens have no expectation
of privacy in financial information “voluntarily conveyed to [] banks
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business.”14 The Court’s holding rested on the notion that individuals
must assume the risk that information voluntarily provided to third
parties will be disclosed to others:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that
the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government . . . . This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed
to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third
party will not be betrayed.15

Thus, because “the depositor ‘assumed the risk’ of disclosure . . . it
would be unreasonable for him to expect his financial records to
remain private.”16
Similarly, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court upheld law
enforcement’s use of a pen register to monitor outgoing calls from a
suspect’s residence.17 The Smith Court relied on Miller, holding that by
“expos[ing] . . . information to its equipment in the ordinary course of
business[, the suspect] assumed the risk that the company would reveal
to police the numbers he dialed.”18 The Court also emphasized that “pen
registers do not acquire the contents of communications,”19 and that
“people in general [do not] entertain any actual expectation of privacy
in the numbers they dial.”20 Thus, “[a]lthough [the suspect’s] conduct
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971) (plurality opinion);
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439
(1963)). In his dissent, in Smith v. Maryland, Justice Marshall stated:
14
15

The prospect of unregulated governmental monitoring will undoubtedly prove
disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to hide. Many individuals, including
members of unpopular political organizations or journalists with confidential sources,
may legitimately wish to avoid disclosure of their personal contacts . . . . Permitting
governmental access to telephone records on less than probable cause may thus impede
certain forms of political affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of a
truly free society. Particularly given the Government’s previous reliance on warrantless
telephonic surveillance to trace reporters’ sources and monitor protected political
activity, I am unwilling to insulate use of pen registers from independent judicial
review.
442 U.S. 735, 751 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
16 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (discussing Miller).
17 See id. at 745–46.
18 Id. at 744.
19 Id. at 741.
20 Id. at 742. The Court explained:
Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from the use of a pen
register whether a communication existed. These devices do not hear sound. They
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may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation
private, his conduct was not and could not have been calculated to
preserve the privacy of the number he dialed.”21 In his dissent, Justice
Marshall argued that “[t]hose who disclose certain facts to a bank or
phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this
information will be released to other persons for other purposes.”22
Recently, however, the Court has called into question the
continuing viability of the third-party doctrine. In United States v.
Jones,23 the Court held that the government’s use of a GPS tracking
device to monitor a suspect’s whereabouts on public roads for twentyeight days constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.24
Although the Court was divided over whether the search was an
unlawful trespass or an infringement of privacy, five Justices suggested
that the length of the surveillance violated a societal expectation of
privacy, notwithstanding the fact that the suspect’s vehicle was
traveling on public roads and readily observable.25 Furthermore, in her
concurrence, Justice Sotomayor directly questioned the validity of the
third-party doctrine, including “the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed
to third parties.”26
Likewise, in Riley v. California,27 the Court held that, in the
absence of exigent circumstances, law enforcement may not search the
contents of a suspect’s cell phone without a warrant and probable
cause.28 The Court relied on the fact that, unlike finite objects such as
plastic containers or crumpled cigarette packs, cell phones store
volumes of private information, such as photographs, financial
documents, and emails.29 In both cases, the Court could have applied the
third-party doctrine and held that citizens have no expectation of
privacy in their public movements or outgoing calls. By doing the
disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed—a means of establishing
communication. Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the
recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is
disclosed by pen registers.
Id. at 741 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)).
21 Id. at 743 (stating “even if he did [have a subjective expectation of privacy], his
expectation was not ‘legitimate’”).
22 Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
23 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
24 See id. at 949 (plurality opinion).
25 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement
agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period”).
26 Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
27 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
28
Id. at 2495.
29 Id. at 2491 (“A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously
found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in
any form—unless the phone is.”).
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opposite and focusing on a societal—rather than subjective—
expectation of privacy, the Court suggested that the third-party doctrine
may be on its last legs.
The federal courts, however, continue to be divided on whether the
third-party doctrine applies to digital-era searches. In Klayman v.
Obama,30 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
held that the National Security Agency’s (NSA) metadata collection
program constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.31 The
district court refused to apply the third-party doctrine, holding that
“the Smith pen register and the ongoing NSA Bulk Telephony Metadata
Program have so many significant distinctions between them that I
cannot possibly navigate these uncharted Fourth Amendment waters
using as my North Star a case that predates the rise of cell phones.”32
Among those distinctions was the sheer volume and breadth of the
metadata collection program.33 As the district court explained, it is one
thing for citizens to assume that “phone companies [] occasionally
provide information to law enforcement,” but quite another to expect
“all phone companies to operate . . . a joint intelligence-gathering
operation with the Government.”34 Conversely, in ACLU v. Clapper,35
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
held that the third-party doctrine negated any expectation of privacy for
outgoing cell phone calls.36 To date, no cases on the Court’s docket
directly address the third-party doctrine’s continuing validity.37
957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
Id. at 32.
32 Id. at 37.
33
Id. at 35–36.
34 Id. at 33 (monitoring calls from a single suspect’s residence “in no way resembles the
daily, all-encompassing, indiscriminate dump of phone metadata that the NSA now receives as
part of its . . . Metadata Program”).
35 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
36 Id. at 749; see also United States v. Moalin, No. 10 Cr 4246(JM), 2013 WL 6079518, at
*7–8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013) (applying Smith to uphold the NSA’s metadata collection
program); United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) (individuals have no
expectation of privacy in information transmitted from a pay-as-you-go cell phone); In re
Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[g]iven
the notoriety surrounding the disclosure of geolocation data . . . cell phone users cannot
realistically entertain the notion that such information would (or should) be withheld from federal
law enforcement agents searching for a fugitive”).
37 But see Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 738 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, City of
Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 400 (2014). In Patel, the Court will address whether: (1) facial
challenges based on the Fourth Amendment are permissible; and (2) warrantless searches of a
hotel’s guest registry violate a hotel owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy and thus require a
warrant and probable cause. Professors Adam Lamparello and Charles E. MacLean filed a brief in
this case arguing that the Court should modify the third-party doctrine and hold that searches of
hotel guest registries violate the hotel guests’ expectation of privacy. Although the Court is only
focusing on the privacy rights of hotel owners, a credible argument can be made that these
searches violate the hotel guests’ privacy rights. See Brief for Adam Lamparello & Charles E.
MacLean as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, City of Los Angeles v. Patel, No. 13-1175
(argued
Mar.
3,
2015),
available
at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp30
31
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B.

The Third-Party Doctrine’s Impact on Standing and the Preclusive
Effect of the Imminent Harm Requirement

The third-party doctrine makes it difficult, if not impossible, for
plaintiffs to claim that online data breaches violate a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The standing doctrine’s “imminent harm”
requirement also prevents citizens from recovering costs associated with
preventing future harm.38
By way of background, the standing doctrine originates from the
“case or controversy” requirement in Article III of the Constitution.39
Standing focuses on “access apart from the merits of the
controversy,”40 and addresses “whether a specific person is the proper
party to bring a matter to the court.”41 Under the Supreme Court’s
current jurisprudence, to establish standing a plaintiff must show that an
injury is “(1) concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (2)
fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action; and (3) redress[able] by a
favorable decision.”42 Accordingly, a plaintiff may not assert a
“generalized grievance,” that reflects the “harm . . . to every citizen’s
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws” or to the
“public at large.”43 Instead, the plaintiff must be injured in a “personal
and individual way,” such that he or she has a “direct stake” in the
outcome.44 Furthermore, “[a]lthough imminence is concededly a
somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose,
which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for
Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.”45 As such,
allegations of a “possible future injury”46 are not sufficient to confer
standing.
The standing requirement is particularly stringent when “reaching
the merits of the dispute would force [the Court] to decide whether an
action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal
Government was unconstitutional.”47 In fact, the Court has “often found
content/uploads/2015/02/13-1175-bsac-Professors-Adam-Lamparello-and-Charles-E.MacLean.pdf.
38 See Rubow, supra note 9, at 1010.
39 See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
40 Rubow, supra note 9, at 1010 (quoting Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and
the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1460 (1988)).
41 Rubow, supra note 9, at 1010 (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 56
(4th ed. 2003)).
42 Id. at 1010 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
43 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013).
44 Id.
45 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at
565, n.2) (holding that efforts to mitigate injury following a data breach are not cognizable
because costs associated with preventing future harm are not sufficiently imminent to confer
standing).
46 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
47 Id. (quoting Raines v. Bird, 521 U.S. 811, 819–820 (2003)).
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a lack of standing in cases in which the Judiciary has been requested to
review actions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence
gathering and foreign affairs.”48
The “actual injury” and “imminent harm” requirements affect
consumers’ ability to recover damages for online data breaches in two
ways. First, consumers cannot claim that they have suffered a
cognizable injury to their privacy because the moment consumers
convey their phone, credit card, and social security numbers to an online
service provider, they forfeit their privacy rights. As such, if this
information is obtained by third parties, e.g., hackers, consumers will
not have standing to sue because, having no expectation of privacy in
the unlawfully accessed data, they have not suffered an actual or
concrete injury to their privacy rights. This leaves citizens wholly
dependent on private companies to implement policies that minimize
the risk of online data breaches, and compensate them fully in the event
of a breach.
Second, the “imminent harm” requirement largely precludes
consumers from suing merchants for the costs incurred when preventing
foreseeable—albeit future—damages.49 In Clapper v. Amnesty
International, the plaintiffs challenged Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act,50 which authorized the surveillance of
individuals who were not “United States persons” and who were located
outside of the United States.51 Several media organizations and civil
rights groups filed suit alleging that there was “an objectively
reasonable likelihood that their communications with their foreign
contacts will be intercepted . . . at some point in the future.”52 The Court
rejected this argument and held that the possibility, even likelihood, of
future harm was not sufficient to satisfy the “imminent harm”
requirement.53
The imminency requirement artificially limits the damages
consumers can recover when their private information is fraudulently
obtained. Admittedly, merchants are required to notify consumers when
an online data breach occurs,54 and if unauthorized charges are
48 Id. (citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11–16 (1972) (plaintiffs did not have standing to
challenge an Army intelligence-gathering program)).
49 See generally Miles L. Galbraith, Identity Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to Plaintiff
Standing for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1365
(2013).
50
50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2012).
51 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1140.
52 Id. at 1147.
53 Id. at 1148 (holding that it “is speculative whether the Government will imminently target
communications to which respondents are parties”).
54
See Caroline C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at the Current State of Data
Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395, 396 (2014) (stating that, “[o]nce the merchant discovers
the data breach, it is often obligated under state law to notify its potentially affected customers
that their information may have fallen into the wrong hands”).
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discovered, the merchants will reverse these charges or reimburse the
affected consumers.55 The financial risk to the consumer, however, does
not stop there.56 Hackers may use a consumer’s personal identifying
information to, among other things, open new credit card accounts and
assume the consumer’s identity on social media.57 Thus, consumers may
incur substantial cost to prevent such harm, prompting them to monitor
their credit report on an ongoing basis. The question then becomes, to
what extent will a private company be responsible for the costs
associated with mitigation, and for damages that result in the future but
are traceable to the initial breach?
At this point, consumers are struggling to recover these costs. In
cases where consumers have instituted class action lawsuits for
mitigation-related damages, many federal courts have held that these
damages are not sufficiently imminent to confer Article III standing.58
Additionally, the courts have not established parameters governing a
merchant’s liability for harm that is proximately caused by an online
data breach, such as where a hacker opens a new credit card account in
a consumer’s name and makes purchases under the consumer’s name, or
where the consumer’s credit score is severely damaged.59
Furthermore, the law provides no remedy for the non-economic but
severely distressful invasion of consumers’ privacy rights.60 None of
this is acceptable because it allocates the risk of loss to consumers even
though they are in no position to prevent the breach and allows the
merchant to escape liability in proximately-caused harms even though it
has the power and resources to minimize the risk of these breaches.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence
should adapt to fit the digital era and provide a sufficient remedy for the
online data breaches that continue to occur on a widespread scale.61 The
Court should: (1) abandon the first prong of Katz and focus exclusively
on whether there is a societal expectation of privacy in data voluntarily
given to third parties; (2) modify the third-party doctrine to hold that,
when a societal expectation of privacy exists, citizens do not forfeit all
privacy expectations in information provided to third parties; and (3)
55 See, e.g., id.; see also Natalie Kim, Note, Three’s a Crowd: Towards Contextual Integrity
in Third-Party Data Sharing, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 325 (2014).
56 See, e.g., Cease, supra note 54, at 396.
57 See, e.g., Meal, supra note 4, at *12; Kori Clanton, Note, We Are Not Who We Pretend to
Be: ODR Alternatives to Online Impersonation Statutes, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 323,
332 (2014) (discussing online impersonation on social media websites).
58 See, e.g., Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138; cf. Michelle Kisloff & Arthur Kim, Courts Split on
Standing for Consumer Plaintiffs in Data Breach Class Actions, HOGAN LOVELLS (Dec. 23,
2014), http://www.hldataprotection.com/2014/12/articles/privacy-security-litigation/courts-spliton-standing-for-consumer-plaintiffs-in-data-breach-class-actions.
59 See, e.g., Meal, supra note 4, at *3.
60 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
61 See generally Laura I. Sorafine & Colin J. Zick, Protect Your Customers: Solutions to New
Privacy and Security Regulations, 28 No. 5 ACC DOCKET 64 (2010).
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relax the “imminent injury” prong to permit recovery for costs
associated with preventing future harm, provided that the harm is a
reasonably foreseeable result of the breach. This approach will permit
recovery for infringements on consumers’ privacy, fully compensate
consumers for their losses, and provide an incentive for private
companies to exercise reasonable care to protect consumers’ private
information.
Ultimately, we no longer live in a world in which citizens purchase
products predominantly with cash, pay their bills with paper checks, or
store private information only in their homes. The digital age transcends
physical space and finite objects; millions of citizens pay their bills
electronically, deposit their paychecks, and purchase books online. They
take photographs with and store confidential documents in their cell
phones. Thus, private information is exposed—and privacy rights are
vulnerable—in a manner that pre-digital era case law never
contemplated.62
CONCLUSION
The third-party, standing, and reasonable expectation of privacy
doctrines make it more difficult for citizens to recover damages directly
and proximately caused by online data breaches, and make it less likely
that private companies will be incentivized to adopt stringent
procedures to protect personal information. In an era of hackers,
malware, and inadvertent disclosures of private information, the law
should allocate the risk to companies that are in a position to minimize
or prevent infringements on consumers’ privacy.63 In the context of
online data breaches, abandoning the third-party doctrine, eliminating
the “imminent harm” prong of the standing doctrine, and focusing on a
societal, not subjective, expectation of privacy, will provide the types of
62 To be clear, this argument has nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment, which only
applies to state action. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Narrowing the State Action Doctrine, 35
TRIAL 101 (July 1999) (explaining that the state action doctrine “is the principle that the
Constitution’s protections of individual liberties . . . apply only to the government. Private
conduct generally does not have to comply with the Constitution”). Of course, the National
Security Agency’s Metadata Collection Program undoubtedly implicates privacy rights, but that
is a separate issue. See, e.g., Joshua Peck, Note, Last Resort: The Threat of Federal Steroid
Legislation—Is the Proposed Legislation Constitutional?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777 (2006).
When dealing with individual privacy rights in non-governmental contexts, tort and contract law
can and should provide a remedy. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Consumer Information Privacy and
the Problem(s) of Third-Party Disclosures, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 321, 351 (2013). If
citizens do not retain privacy rights in information surrendered to third parties, however, they will
have no standing and thus no remedy for infringements on privacy violations when hackers obtain
their credit card information through a merchant’s server. That, in a nutshell, is the problem.
63 See Chronology of Data Breaches: Security Breaches 2005–Present, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE (Apr. 20, 2005), http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach (last updated Dec.
31, 2013).
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safeguards that meet the challenges posed by digital era technology.

